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The Mathematics of Risk
An introduction to guaranteed data de-identification

?
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Going about things backwards?
Dr. Khaled El Emam, Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario, “Privacy enhancing
technologies to enable the sharing of health data for secondary purposes.”
▪ How do you create safe, shareable versions of data that can’t be sufficiently de-identified?

Vance Lockton, Information and Privacy Commissioner’s Office, Ontario, “What
is ‘reasonable’? Exploring when a de-identification process is sufficiently
protective.”
▪ How do you decide when data has been reasonably deidentified?

Kristi Thompson, Western University, London Ontario, “The mathematics of risk:
an introduction to guaranteed data de-identification.”
▪ What is this de-identification thing anyway and why is it so hard?
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Some context
“Grant recipients are required to deposit into a digital repository all digital research
data, metadata and code that directly support the research conclusions in journal
publications and pre-prints that arise from agency-supported research.”
◦ From the Tri-Agency Research Data Management Policy

This does not mean sharing all data openly, and the policy has many exceptions
baked in. But most current academic and journal repositories are designed to
make open sharing the most convenient option.
I’m approaching this as a research data management librarian – someone
expected to help researchers comply with this policy.

◦ Are researchers expected to understand when data deidentification is needed to comply
with this policy? Are data curators? Research ethics boards?
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Background
and key
concepts
IDENTIFIERS, QUASI -IDENTIFIERS,
RISK
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Direct Identifiers
Any information collected by the researcher that places study participants at immediate risk of
being reidentified
Full or parts of: Names, addresses, telephone numbers, or any identifiers used by the
researchers to link data to one of the above
Detailed geography (areas containing less than 20,000 people is a rule of thumb - HIPAA)

IP addresses and other information that may be associated with a computer
Exact dates linked to individuals or events are highly identifying
HIPAA recognizes 18 personal identifiers that will qualify data as personal health information;
the BMJ compiled a list of 28 based on multiple international research guidelines
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Quasi-identifiers
Characteristics relating to individuals that could be linked with other data sources to violate the
confidentiality of individuals
A variable should be considered a quasi-identifier if an attacker could plausibly match that
variable to information from another source to determine the identity of an individual
Some variables may be used in combination to derive quasi-identifiers, e.g. community size (at
first glance not particularly identifying) could be combined with a broader geographic grouping
to infer location more precisely
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Hidden identifiers
Quasi-identifiers are commonly thought of as demographic variables and socio-economic
variables that have the potential to be linked with other data sources to violate the
confidentiality of participants, or to be recognized by a person acquainted with the survey
respondent.
◦ Specific examples include age, gender identity, income, occupation, industry / place of work, geography,
ethnic and immigration variables

Potentially, membership in specific organizations, use of specific services
Variables that relate to geography in any way need to be treated with extreme caution
◦ Potential community identifiers can include features like presence of a university hospital or
international airport
◦ E.G. variable giving distance to nearest emergency department
◦ Need to be considered alongside any contextual information about the dataset
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Risk – a technical definition
Risk is created when:
◦ Variables can isolate individuals in the dataset
◦ Identifying information can be matched to persistent information that an attacker may reasonably have
access to

A set of records that has the same values on all quasi-identifiers is called an equivalence class
An equivalence class of one corresponds to an individual who is unique in the dataset on some
combination of characteristics. Such a person may be at risk of being identified.
◦ This person is called a sample unique. If your survey is a complete sample of some population, this
person is also a population unique.
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Assessing and
dealing with risk:
statistical
disclosure risk
assessment
AN INTRODUCTION TO
K-ANONYMITY
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Assessing quasi-identifiers
◦ Quasi-identifying variables containing groups with small numbers of
respondents (e.g. a religion variable with 3 individual responses of "Buddhism")
pose high risk.
◦ Extreme values (more than 10 children; very high income) pose high risk
◦ Size of identifiable groups in the general population also need to be considered
◦ There may be only one person from Winnipeg in your random digit cell phone user survey, but if your
survey doesn’t narrow it down any further than that, that person is pretty safe

◦ Contextual information that accompanies the data should also be part of the
analysis
◦ If it is clear from the context of your research that all your interview subjects worked at a particular tool
and die plant in Oshawa, that narrows things down quite a bit
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Common sense (can only take you so far)
Look at the demographic variables in the dataset and consider describing an individual to a
friend using only the values of those variables. Is there any likelihood that the person would be
recognizable?
“I’m thinking of a person living in Toronto who is female, married, has a University degree, is
between the ages of 40 and 55 and has an income of between 60 and 75 thousand dollars.”
◦ Even if there is only one such person in the dataset, this is not enough information to create risk…
◦ UNLESS contextual information about the dataset narrows things down further
◦ Let’s say you know this is a survey of referees for the OHA…

Also, consider unusual combinations of variables – let’s say someone belongs to the under-16
age group and also responded that they were married.

How do you figure this out without needing to know every single combination in the data?
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K-anonymity
K-anonymity is a mathematical approach to demonstrating that a dataset is anonymized
◦ First proposed by computer scientists in 1998 and has formed the basis of formal data anonymization
efforts since then

Concept: it should not be possible to isolate fewer than K individual cases in your dataset based
on any combination of identifying variables
That is, a record cannot be distinguished from K-1 other records in its equivalence class.
K is a number set by the researcher; three and five are both commonly used
Values higher than fifteen are rarely used, according to one article I found. In practice I have not
seen a value higher than five referenced and this is the number most frequently referred to in
the literature.
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Equivalence classes and “data twins”
It should not be possible to isolate fewer than
k individual cases in your dataset based on any
combination of identifying variables
Cases 1, 6 and 13 form an equivalence class
with k=3
◦ Each case in the equivalence class has 2 “data
twins”

Case 14 has no data twins – it is a sample
unique
A dataset’s k is the size of the smallest
equivalence class in the dataset – in this case
1.
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Data reduction – global reduction and local
suppression
Global data reduction
◦ Grouping into categories e.g. age in 10 year increments
◦ For already categorical variables, merging into larger groups
◦ Complete removal of risky variables from the dataset

Data

Local suppression
◦ Deleting individual cases or responses
◦ For example, a member of the ‘under 16’ age group who responded ‘married’
might have their response to the marriage question deleted as an alternative to
further recoding the otherwise non-risky variables of AgeGroup or MaritalStatus

By looking at frequencies and creating bivariate tables of variables, it is
possible to single out the riskiest categories on variables and regroup /
suppress them as a prelude to checking k-anonymity, and then look at
equivalence classes to find remaining risky cases and fix them
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Checking k-anonymity
Stata statistical language:
egen equivalence_group= group(var1 var2 var3 var4 var5)
* create a variable to count cases in each equivalence group
sort equivalence_group
by equivalence_group: gen equivalence_size =_N
tab equivalence_group if equivalence_size < 5, sort

R statistical language
library('plyr’)
# Figure out what equivalence classes there are, and how many cases in each
equivalence class.
dfunique <- ddply(df, .(var1, var2, var3, var4, var5), nrow)
dfunique <- dfunique[order(dfunique$V1),]
View(dfunique)
The UK Anonymisation Network Anonymization Decision-Making Framework, appendix B has code for doing this in SPSS.
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Guaranteed data anonymization
k-anonymity is intended to be a form of guaranteed data anonymization and is often described
as such.
It guarantees that every record in the anonymized data will be indistinguishable from k-1 other
records in the same dataset.

However…
Research participants are not generally told that no one will know which line of the data file
holds their confidential information. They are told their answers to research questions will be
kept confidential.
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Attribute
disclosure
INTRODUCING L-DIVERSITY AND FRIENDS
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Attribute Disclosure
Cases 1, 6 and 13 still form an equivalence class with
k=3. So even if you know which people in this survey
population match those characteristics, you can’t tell
which person matches which case
BUT
They all answered a particular question (about
whether their workplace should unionize) the same
way
You now know how all three of them answered this
question. Confidentiality had been violated.
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l-diversity and friends
Extensions of k-anonymity, including p-anonymity and l-diversity, have been proposed to deal
with attribute disclosure; they all involve rules around what values the attributes within an
equivalence class should have
Example: one of the simpler variants, called distinct l-diversity
◦ A dataset satisfies distinct l-diversity if, for each group of records in an equivalence class (matching on
all their quasi-identifiers) there are at least l different responses for each confidential variable
◦ So for our workplace survey, every group of data twins would have to contain both yes and no answers
to the “unionize” question, since two would be the maximum possible value for l for this question
◦ And this would have to be true for some value of l for every confidential answer in the dataset

Imagine a typical survey dataset with dozens of questions, each of which needs to be considered
for l -diversity for each equivalence class…

19

Issues with techniques like l-diversity
Only practical to implement in datasets with very few variables

No computationally efficient ways of doing these; far too time consuming to be done by hand
◦ For some of the more esoteric methods, no theoretical implementations have even been described
◦ It’s been demonstrated that even in relatively simple cases (such as l-diversity with few attributes)
automatedly solving for optimal data utility while protecting privacy is NP hard – meaning, essentially,
that the time taken to run such an algorithm increases exponentially with the size of the dataset

Even if they could be implemented, in most cases achieving anything like distinct
l-diversity (or t-closeness, or p-diversity) would completely destroy the reanalysis value of the
dataset, making going to this level of effort to make data shareable rather pointless
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The role of
sampling
21

A 50% sample
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Sampling
Creates uncertainty that any given individual is in the dataset at all
A sample unique may not be a population unique
◦ Still a concern…

That is, if an equivalence class in the dataset can be assumed to have co-equivalents (data twins)
outside the dataset whose opinions or attributes are unknown, then attributes are not disclosed by
membership in an equivalence class

This is a reasonable assumption in cases where:
◦ k-anonymity is met for k >=5
◦ Sample is a small subset of the population it is drawn from
◦ There is variation in the attributes being looked at

Attribute disclosure in the absence of identity disclosure ceases to be a concern in the case of a small
sample drawn from a large population, given appropriate levels of variation in the attributes.
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Practical examples: sampling and geography
And how I got involved with this stuff in the first place
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Rescuing messy data
First became seriously involved with data
anonymization due to a data rescue project
Series of government department datasets
released due to an open government mandate
Versions initially made available were
unusable due to missing documentation and
general incomprehensibility; documented
versions made available on request had not
been anonymized.
Our contact recognized that this was a
problem but had no de-identified version of
the survey, or resources for fixing it
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The first test survey
Survey of adolescents asking about an ad campaign

~1500 respondents, limited demographics, various non-identifying variables
Five quasi-identifier variables of concern: age (3 categories), sex (2), geographic region (7),
visible minority status (2) and Aboriginal* status (2)
◦ 126 Possible equivalence classes (not 168 because visible minority and Aboriginal status are mutually
exclusive as defined (...ask them))

If these were distributed equally across the dataset, we would expect each equivalence class to
contain about 12 cases
For most real-world variables, some groups will be much larger than others. In practice we had
21 equivalence classes with only a single member, and a total of 42 equivalence classes with less
than 5 members
* Aboriginal is the term used in these surveys,
currently Indigenous is the preferred term
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k-anonymity is hard
Only five quasi-identifier variables, only a few categories each

Fairly large dataset
Was not able to produce a dataset that satisfied k-anonymity, let alone any more stringent
criteria such as l-diversity, while retaining all five variables
Was able to achieve k-anonymity by deleting the region variable; on the remaining four variables
there were no equivalence classes smaller than 5.
k-anonymity is difficult to achieve in practice, and the difficulty increases as the number of
quasi-identifying variables increases and the number of cases in the dataset decreases
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The role of sampling, redux
How risky would it have been to retain the region variable? Were the sample unique cases (the 21
equivalence classes with only a single member) also population uniques?
Checked by downloading a Census of Canada public use file, subsetting it, manipulating the variables
and weighting the file to produce a dataset that matched my survey but represented the population
aged 13-15 in Canada at that time as a whole
◦ In effect, created an artificial census of the population my survey was drawn from

In the artificial Census dataset, the smallest equivalence class was estimated to have 370 cases, with
the next smallest containing 518, and the remaining 214 equivalence classes being considerably
larger
Each sample unique in the survey is estimatd to have a minimum of 369 data twins in the general
population – k-anonymity overestimated reidentification risk by a factor of 370!
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Second test survey
Additional survey with similar demographic variables, plus additional data associated with
participant location
In addition to checking k-anonymity based on demographic variables (in this survey, limited)
wanted to look at the geographic variables
Service survey of a population living in small and remote communities. Did not have exact
location, community names, or anything obvious like that except province…
But did identify some respondents as being located on a reservation, and also had a variable
giving approximate distance to nearest major city
Original un-de-identified dataset also had partial postal codes that could be used to check
guesses
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Penetration testing and data linkage
Means of assessing resistance of de-identified dataset to reidentification of survey participants
or their attributes
Remember: quasi-identifiers contain information that can be matched to persistent information
that an attacker may reasonably have access to
From publicly available information, a data intruder can easily construct a table of reservations
by province and their distance from the nearest city
For each participant, their province of residence and distance from the nearest city can be
compared to the entries in the table of reservations by province and distance to the nearest city
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Use of data linkage to construct lists of candidate
locations for survey participants
Hypothetical example:
◦ Participant living in Alberta on a reservation
◦ Response: 80 km from nearest city
◦ 2 possibilities only 10 km apart from one
another: Samson and Ermineskin Tribe

Of over 1,000 individuals surveyed, a single
location for their potential place of residence
was found for 98

Of the 98, the (suppressed) value for forward
sortation area (first three digits of postal
code) was correct for 24 cases (~25% of
guesses)
Accuracy could be improved with access to
more specialized GIS tools
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Hidden identifiers
“Distance from respondent’s community to
nearest large city” does not generally show up on
lists of possible identifiers or quasi-identifiers to
check for
◦ Community name, yes.
Variables that are not obviously risky may be
used in combination to derive other quasiidentifiers
◦ So burn it all down?

Anything relating to geography needs to be
considered. By extension, there might be similar
variables that can indirectly identify other
groups, such as clubs, organizations, or
employers.
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Automation
ALGORITHMIC OPTIONS
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Anonymization hierarchies
Software tools for de-identifying quantitative data that I have investigated take a hierarchy
approach to automatically deidentifying data.
This basically means that the user needs to pre-define possible generalizations for the quasiidentifiers in the dataset, and the program searches for possible solutions and recommends a
set of the generalizations to use.
For datasets with many quasi-identifiers, or cases where several datasets with similar quasiidentifiers need to be deidentified, this might be a useful approach… if a tool can be found that
actually does the job.
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Possible hierarchy for the variable
“Marital Status”
Legally married
Living with
spouse
Delete variable

Common law
Single

Not living with
spouse

Single
Divorced

Formerly married

Separated
Widowed
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Tools implementing these approaches
While working on the initial deidentification project and later while contributing to some
documents for a working group, I tested several free / open anonymization packages that I found
recommended on various lists.
The two that seemed most functional (although still with some shortcomings particularly in
documentation) were SDCMicro, an R package with a graphical interface, and Amnesia. Both had
usability issues, were not adequately documented, and Amnesia didn’t seem to handle missing
values correctly. Online reviews suggested that all the packages had issues handling large or
complex datasets.
Commercial software and for-fee services exist. I have not had the opportunity to try any.
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Final observations
Guaranteeing that data has been ‘reasonably’ anonymized is difficult, and the difficulty
increases exponentially with the number of potentially identifying variables present.

k-anonymity can be calculated easily using standard statistical software. Achieving k-anonymity
can require a great deal of data modification or suppression, though the role of sampling
somewhat mitigates this. A dataset that is a complete sample of a small, known population is
very difficult to deidentify unless the number of demographic and attribute variables is trivial.
Software aimed at the general academic survey researcher should not assume special
knowledge in the field of data de-identification. I didn’t find any free packages I would really
recommend, out of the 6 packages I tried.
The new Tri-Agency policy on Research Data Management mandates open sharing of research
data where possible. Most of the academic social science researchers I know do not have the
knowledge to assess their data for anonymization. The data curators who administer universitybased data repositories are similarly unequipped. We desperately need better supports.
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